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Note
KELLY V. SOUTH CAROLINA: EXTENDING DUE PROCESS
CREATES AN UNTENABLE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING
WHEN CAPITAL SENTENCING JURIES SHOULD BE
INFORMED OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY
In Kelly v. South Carolina,' the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the Supreme Court of South Carolina properly re-
fused a jury instruction on a capital defendant's parole ineligibility
when the prosecution alluded to indicia of the defendant's future
dangerousness during the trial.2 The Supreme Court held that evi-
dence presented by the prosecution raised the issue of future danger-
ousness; therefore, pursuant to the Court's decision in Simmons v.
South Carolina,3 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment4 requires a jury instruction indicating that Kelly would be ineli-
gible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment.5 Although the
Court reached the correct result by requiring that the jury be in-
formed of Kelly's parole ineligibility, the Court's rationale weakened
an already imprecise standard for determining when parole ineligibil-
ity must be disclosed to the jury.6 This issue should have been ad-
dressed by relying on the Eighth Amendment's requirement of an
individualized sentencing determination in capital sentencing cases.7
1. 534 U.S. 246 (2002).
2. Id. at 248-51.
3. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality).
4. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. All future references to the Fourteenth Amendment will
concern only the Due Process Clause.
5. Kelly, 534 U.S. at 252.
6. Id. at 259 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority decision has "al-
most no connection with the due process rationale of Simmons").
7. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
The United States Supreme Court, in Woodson v. North Carolina, interpreted the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment as requiring that the state exercise
the power to punish capital defendants "'within the limits of civilized standards."' 428 U.S.
280, 288 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality)). The Court
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An individualized sentencing determination would have allowed the
Court to require a parole ineligibility instruction in capital cases with-
out relying on the due process rational of Simmons, and its adverse
consequences.
I. THE CASE
In 1996, a South Carolina jury convicted William Kelly of murder,
kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a knife during the com-
mission of a violent crime.' During the sentencing phase, the prose-
cution presented testimony from fellow inmates and prison employees
of Kelly's actions while incarcerated.9 A prison administrator testified
that Kelly gouged out a mortar joint in his cell.' Kelly's former
cellmate also testified that Kelly had made a shank and spoke of tak-
ing a female correctional officer hostage." In addition, the prosecu-
tion elicited testimony during cross-examination from a psychologist
concerning Kelly's "inclination to kill anyone who rubbed him the
wrong way.
' 2
Prior to closing arguments, Kelly's counsel asked the trial judge
to instruct the jury that if Kelly were to receive life imprisonment, he
would not be eligible for parole. 3 In seeking this instruction, Kelly's
counsel relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sim-
mons.' 4 The Simmons instruction sought by Kelly's counsel was a near-
verbatim recitation of the definition of life imprisonment under
South Carolina law, which defines life imprisonment as "until death of
found that the "fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment re-
quires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process
of inflicting the penalty of death." Id. at 304. The Court referred to this practice as "indi-
vidualizing sentencing determinations." Id.
8. State v. Kelly, 540 S.E.2d 851, 853 (S.C. 2001). The victim, Shirley Shealy, Kelly's
former co-worker, was found dead with her hands taped behind her back and money
strewn over the floor and her body. Id. Shealy, who was twenty-three weeks pregnant at
the time of the murder, had been stabbed thirty-one times and bled to death. After being
arrested, Kelly confessed to the murder. Id
9. Id. at 855.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 256, 248-49 (2002).
13. Id. at 249.
14. The Court in Simmons held that when the prosecution argues a capital defendant's
future danger to society as a reason to impose a death sentence, due process entitles the
defendant to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154, 168-69 (1994) (plurality).
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the offender."1 5 The prosecution objected on the basis that he would
not argue Kelly's future dangerousness and therefore the Simmons
rule did not apply. 6 Kelly's counsel responded, arguing that the pros-
ecution had already raised the issue of future dangerousness through
evidence presented earlier in the trial.1 7 Nevertheless, the trial judge
denied the requested instruction, explaining that the evidence
presented by the prosecution had not actually raised the issue of fu-
ture dangerousness; it simply described Kelly's character.1 8
During closing arguments, despite defense counsel's objection,
the prosecution referred to Kelly as "Bloody Billy" and the "butcher of
Batesburg,"'" and described Kelly as "intelligent" and "quick-witted"
arguing that this made him "a little more dangerous" and unpredict-
able.2 ° The prosecution concluded by stating that "murderers will be
murderers" and "he is the cold-blooded one right over there."2 ' After
closing arguments, the trial judge instructed the jury to consider five
statutory aggravating circumstances and three statutory mitigating fac-
tors in deciding between recommendations of death or life imprison-
ment. 22 The trial judge did not inform the jury that if Kelly were
sentenced to life imprisonment, he would be ineligible for parole.2 3
The jury was simply told that Kelly's future dangerousness should not
15. Kelly, 534 U.S. at 269; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 2001). The South
Carolina statute states in relevant part:
For purposes of this section, "life imprisonment" means until death of the of-
fender. No person sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to this section is
eligible for parole, community supervision, or any early release program, nor is
the person eligible to receive any work credits, education credits, good conduct
credits, or any other credits that would reduce the mandatory life imprisonment
required by this section.
Id
16. Kelly, 534 U.S. at 249.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 249-50.
20. Id. at 250. The trial judge never ruled on the objection from Kelly's counsel and
the prosecution's closing statements continued without further objection. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. South Carolina law allows the judge to include in the jury instruction eleven
statutory aggravating circumstances and ten statutory mitigating circumstances should the
judge feel these factors are supported by the evidence. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law.
Co-op. 2001). In addition, the judge may instruct the jury on other mitigating factors
authorized by law. Id. If the jury determines that a statutory aggravating circumstance
exists, then the jury must sentence the defendant to death or life imprisonment. Id. § 16-3-
20(B). However, if the jury does not find an aggravating circumstance, then the jury does
not make a sentencing determination and the judge must sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment or a mandatory minimum prison term of thirty years. Id. § 16-3-20(C).
23. Kelly, 534 U.S. at 250.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
be taken into consideration. 24 The trial judge simply told the jury that
"the terms 'life imprisonment' and 'death sentence' are to be under-
stood in [their] ordinary and plain meaning."2' Kelly's counsel ob-
jected, reiterating her earlier request for a Simmons instruction or an
instruction regarding the prosecution's stipulation that future danger-
ousness was not at issue.26 The trialjudge denied both requests. After
deliberation, the jury returned with a finding of all five statutory ag-
gravating circumstances and a recommendation of death, with which
the trial court agreed.27
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Kelly's
sentence.28 The court explained that a Simmons instruction is only
available to a defendant if two specific circumstances are met.29 First,
the state must place future dangerousness at issue and second, the
only two sentencing recommendations available to ajury must be life
imprisonment without parole or death.3 ° Kelly argued that evidence
presented by the prosecution at trial regarding his behavior in prison
raised the issue of future dangerousness. 3 ' The court disagreed, hold-
ing that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not the kind
contemplated by Simmons. 2 The court interpreted the Court's hold-
ing in Simmons as requiring ajury instruction on parole ineligibility as
a means of rebutting an argument of future dangerousness only when
the argument pertains to the defendant's future dangerousness
outside of prison.33 Informing the jury that Kelly would be ineligible
for parole if sentenced to life in prison would not rebut the state's
evidence that Kelly was an escape risk.34 Therefore, the court held
that Kelly did not meet the first element necessary to trigger a Simmons
instruction. 5
24. Id.
25. Id. (citation omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 251.
28. State v. Kelly, 540 S.E.2d 851, 853 (S.C. 2001).
29. Id. at 856; see aso Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 178 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (explaining that due process would entitle a defendant to inform the jury
of his parole ineligibility when the state places future dangerousness at issue and the jury's
sentencing alternatives are limited to life imprisonment without parole and death).
30. Kelly, 540 S.E.2d at 853.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 857.
33. Id
34. Id. The court further concluded that future dangerousness could not be logically
inferred from the evidence presented nor was it presented by the prosecution in closing
arguments. Id.
35. Id.
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Kelly also argued that a Simmons instruction was required because
the jury had no choice but to find at least one aggravating circum-
stance in the sentencing phase, thus automatically limiting their
choice in sentencing alternatives under South Carolina law to life im-
prisonment or death.36 Again, the court disagreed, reasoning that a
jury may not always find a statutory aggravating factor. 7 Because the
jury might not find any aggravating circumstances, life imprisonment
was not the only alternative to a death sentence.38 Accordingly, the
court held that Kelly did not meet the second prong of the Simmons
test.3' The court concluded that the trial court properly refused
Kelly's request for a Simmons instruction.4" Consequently, Kelly ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court.41 The Court granted cer-
tiorari to determine whether the holding in Simmons applied to the
South Carolina statutory sentencing scheme and whether the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina properly concluded that future dan-
gerousness was not at issue.4 2
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court has taken two different ap-
proaches to examining state capital sentencing procedures. Under
the first approach, the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits state capital sentenc-
ing procedures that do not allow for individualized sentencing deter-
minations.44 In particular, the Court has invalidated sentencing
procedures that deny consideration of potentially mitigating factors in
sentencing determinations.45 In the second approach, the Court has
36. Id. at 858. Specifically, Kelly argued that the jury would have "violated its oath" had
it not found at least one aggravating circumstance in this case. Id.
37. Id. The court noted that a conviction made in the guilt phase of a trial is not
binding on the sentencing jury. Id. The sentencing jury is required to make an indepen-
dent finding of an aggravating circumstance. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 251 (2002).
42. Id.
43. Compare Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality) (stating
that the Eighth Amendment "requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense"), with Gardner v. Flor-
ida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (acknowledging that requirements of the Due Process Clause
apply not only to the trial, but to the sentencing process as well).
44. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. The Court noted that the Eighth Amendment is applica-
ble to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 287 n.8.
45. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (stating that "the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as
2003]
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invalidated state capital sentencing procedures under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that do not afford a capital de-
fendant an opportunity to deny or explain evidence presented against
him.46
These two lines of reasoning merge in the Court's consideration
of whether a capital defendant is permitted to inform a jury that he
will be ineligible for parole when the prosecution argues future dan-
gerousness as a reason to sentence a capital defendant to death. The
Court has determined that the Eighth Amendment requires that a
capital defendant be given the opportunity to introduce evidence of
his character and record to mitigate an offense, and that due process
requires that a capital defendant be given the opportunity to deny or
explain the evidence presented against him.47 Simmons, however,
marked a turn in the Supreme Court's analysis of the issue of future
dangerousness. In Simmons, the Court relied exclusively on the Due
Process Clause.4" Since Simmons, the Supreme Court has abandoned
the Eighth Amendment's individualized sentencing requirement in
analyzing the issue of future dangerousness.49
A. The Evaluation of State Capital Sentencing Procedures Under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
Under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unu-
sual punishment, the Court has developed a framework for analyzing
state capital sentencing procedures.5 ° In particular, the Court has
held that the Eighth Amendment permits the sentencer to consider,
a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death").
46. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362 (holding that the defendant was denied due process when
he was sentenced to death based on information he had no opportunity to deny or
explain).
47. SeeSkipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986) (noting that when the prose-
cution argues future dangerousness as a reason to impose death, the individualized sen-
tencing rule from Lockett and Eddings requires the defendant be given an opportunity to
rebut the assertion of future dangerousness, and due process requires an opportunity to
deny or explain the prosecution's evidence).
48. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (plurality) (holding that
due process requires that the jury be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility when
future dangerousness is at issue). The Court in Simmons expressly declined to consider
whether the Eighth Amendment compelled the same result. Id. at 162 n.4.
49. SeeShaferv. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51 (2001) (holding that "whenever future
dangerousness is at issue . . . due process requires that the jury be informed that a life
sentence carries no possibility of parole").
50. See Woodson v. South Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality) (explaining
that a state's power to sentence a capital defendant to death is limited by the Eighth
Amendment); see also Gardner, 430 U.S. at 364 (White, J., concurring) (explaining that the
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as potentially mitigating, any evidence of the defendant's character,
prior criminal record, or any particular circumstance of the commit-
ted offense that the defendant offers as a reason to impose a sentence
other than death.51 Specifically, in Woodson v. North Carolina,2 the
Supreme Court invalidated a North Carolina mandatory death penalty
law, which required that defendants convicted of first-degree murder
be automatically sentenced to death. The Court held that North
Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute was inconsistent with the
Eighth Amendment's requirement that the state exercise the power to
inflict the death penalty within limits set by contemporary societal
standards.54 Although this determination rested to a large extent on
the Court's recognition that mandatory death penalty statutes contra-
dict evolving standards of decency in a civilized society,5 5 the Court
also held that the North Carolina statute violated the Eighth Amend-
ment because it did not allow a jury to consider factors particular to
the defendant, such as his character and the circumstances of the of-
fense prior to sentencing him to death. 6 The Court noted that al-
though an individualized sentencing determination "generally reflects
simply enlightened policy," requiring a consideration of the character
of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense is a "constitu-
tionally indispensable" part of a capital sentencing procedure.5 7 The
Court reasoned that the death penalty is qualitatively different from
even a life term of imprisonment, and this difference creates a need
for reliability in the determination that the punishment of death is
appropriate in each capital case. 58 An individualized sentencing de-
termination, therefore, allows the jury to focus on particular charac-
teristics of the defendant, satisfying the need for heightened reliability
in capital sentencing.59
foundation of an individualized sentencing standard, as formulated by the Court in Wood-
son, is the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment).
51. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
52. 428 U.S. 280.
53. Id. at 305. Woodson was convicted of committing first-degree murder that oc-
curred during an armed robbery of a convenience store. Id. at 282-83.
54. Id. at 301 (asserting that the Eighth Amendment "require[s] that the State's power
to punish 'be exercised within the limits of civilized standards'") (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
55. See id. at 289-301 (discussing the development of the Eighth Amendment and
mandatory death penalty statutes from 1791 to 1977).
56. Id. at 304. The Court in Woodson also invalidated the North Carolina statute based
on a third deficiency, that it failed to adequately curtail unbridled jury discretion in impos-
ing death sentences. Id. at 302.
57. Id. at 304.
58. Id. at 305.
59. Id. at 304-05.
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The Court reinforced the need for individualized sentencing in
Lockett v. Ohio.6" In Lockett, the Supreme Court considered the consti-
tutionality of an Ohio statute under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, because the statute did not require the sentencing
judge to consider certain mitigating factors such as the defendant's
prior record, character, or age. 6' A jury convicted the defendant of
aggravated murder based on her participation in an armed robbery of
a pawnshop and murder of the pawnbroker at the store.6 2 Pursuant
to Ohio law, the trial judge ordered a presentence report and psycho-
logical evaluations, which revealed detailed information concerning
the defendant's background and character.63 Based on these reports
and arguments regarding the penalty that should be imposed, but
without addressing all relevant mitigating factors, the trial judge deter-
mined that the offense was not the product of mental deficiency and
sentenced the defendant to death.64
Prior to Lockett, the Supreme Court had not considered what evi-
dence would be relevant to a proper individualized sentencing deter-
mination. 65 The Court held the Ohio statute to be unconstitutional,
concluding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require con-
sideration of any element of the defendant's character and record as a
relevant mitigating factor that may provide a basis for imposing a
lesser sentence. 66 The Court, citing to its decision in Woodson, reiter-
ated that the qualitative difference between a sentence of death and a
sentence of imprisonment provides a heightened need to consider
the uniqueness of the individual in each case.67 While the Court rec-
ognized that "no perfect procedure" exists to determine when the
death penalty should be imposed, the failure to give mitigating weight
60. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
61. Id. at 597.
62. Id. at 590-93.
63. Id. at 594. The report described the defendant as a "21-year-old with low-average or
average intelligence, and not suffering from a mental deficiency." Id.
64. Id. Under the Ohio statute, the trial judge was required to sentence the defendant
to death unless it was found that "(1) the victim had induced or facilitated the offense, (2)
it was unlikely that [the defendant] would have committed the offense but for the fact that
she was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation, or (3) the offense was primarily the
product of [the defendant's] psychosis or mental deficiency." Id. at 593-94 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 604 (acknowledging that the Court's prior invalidation of a mandatory death
penalty statute in Woodson did not consider which mitigating factors would be relevant or
how much weight they should be given).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 605.
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to the defendant's character and record is "incompatible with the
commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. "68
The Supreme Court again addressed the issue of individualized
sentencing in Eddings v. Oklahoma.69 In Eddings, the Court addressed
an Oklahoma death penalty statute that did not explicitly define what
constitutes mitigating evidence in a capital sentencing hearing and
allowed the trial judge to disregard evidence of the defendant's troub-
led youth as not being relevant mitigating evidence. y The defendant,
who was sixteen years old, killed a police officer during a routine traf-
fic stop." During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel presented
substantial evidence of the defendant's troubled childhood and his
mental and emotional developmental problems.72 Although the sen-
tencing judge did consider the defendant's age as mitigating, the
Oklahoma law did not define what qualified as a mitigating circum-
stance, and thus the sentencing judge refused to consider the evi-
dence of the defendant's troubled upbringing as mitigating.73 The
Supreme Court, relying on its decision in Lockett, held that the failure
of the Oklahoma sentencing judge to consider potentially mitigating
evidence precluded an individualized sentencing determination.74
Therefore, the Court concluded, that although a sentencer is free to
determine how much weight to afford mitigating circumstances, a sen-
tencer may not refuse to consider relevant mitigating evidence.75
Under the Due Process Clause, the Court has formed a second
foundation for the purpose of examining state capital sentencing pro-
cedures.76 Specifically, the Court has held that due process requires
that a capital defendant not be sentenced to death based upon evi-
dence he had no opportunity to deny or explain.77 The Supreme
Court first discussed the application of the Due Process Clause to state
68. Id.
69. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
70. Id. at 106-09.
71. Id. at 105-06. The defendant, Eddings, and several of his friends had run away from
their homes in his brother's car. Id. at 105. Eddings momentarily lost control of the car
and was signaled to pullover by a highway patrol officer. Id. at 106. When the officer
approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun out the window and shot and killed
the officer. Id.
72. Id at 107.
73. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 109.
74. Id. at 113 (stating "[w)e find that the limitations placed by these courts upon the
mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule in Lockett").
75. Id. at 114-15.
76. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality) (noting that a sentenc-
ing procedure "must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause").
77. Id. at 362.
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capital sentencing procedures in Gardner v. Florida.78 In Gardner, the
defendant was convicted of murdering his wife.79 The jury, finding
that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circum-
stances, returned an advisory verdict suggesting that the court sen-
tence the defendant to life imprisonment.8 0 The trial judge then
ordered a presentence investigation report on the defendant.8 l After
reviewing the report, the judge made an ultimate finding that the ag-
gravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstance and
sentenced the defendant to death.82 Although the trial judge consid-
ered the entirety of the presentence investigation report when making
his sentencing determination, one portion of the report was deemed
confidential and not disclosed to the defendant.8 3
The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence, recognizing
that state sentencing procedures must satisfy the Due Process
Clause. 4 The Court reasoned that while the defendant may not have
a substantive right to a particular sentence, he does have an interest in
the nature of the procedures leading to the sentencing determina-
tion.8 5 In this case, the sentencing procedures allowed the trial judge
to impose a death sentence based on confidential information not dis-
closed to the defendant.8 6 Accordingly, the Court held that the de-
fendant was denied due process of law because his sentence was
imposed based in part on information he had no opportunity to deny
or explain.8 7
Although the majority relied on the Due Process Clause, Justice
White, in a concurring opinion, argued that the Eighth Amendment,
as interpreted in Woodson, would have compelled the same result.8
Justice White contended that Woodson and Gardner were indistinguish-
able, in that, both concerned state capital sentencing procedures.89
78. 430 U.S. 349.
79. Id. at 351. The defendant killed his wife by assaulting her with a blunt object. Id.
Evidence presented at trial showed that the defendant had been drinking all day and had
no recollection of the assault. I& at 352.
80. Id. at 352-53. The jury was instructed to determine if the prosecution proved the
aggravating circumstance that the crime committed was "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel," whether any mitigating circumstances outweighed this aggravating circumstance,
and whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. Id. at 352.
81. Id. at 353.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 358.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 362.
88. Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 363.
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Justice White further argued that a state sentencing procedure that
allows a sentencer to consider secret information concerning the de-
fendant's character and record fails to meet the need for reliable sen-
tencing determinations.9 ° Justice White interpreted the Court's
decision in Woodson as relying exclusively on the Eighth Amendment,
and expressly disclaimed the possible application of the Fourteenth
Amendment as unnecessary "other than as the vehicle by which the
strictures of the Eighth Amendment are triggered."'"
B. The Court's Examination of Future Dangerousness and Parole
Ineligibility in State Capital Sentencing Procedures
The Supreme Court's examination of state capital sentencing
procedures has raised the issue of whether indicia of future danger-
ousness and the capital defendant's parole status are proper factors
for a jury to consider in making a sentencing determination.92 The
Supreme Court has determined that a sentencer may consider future
dangerousness as an aggravating factor and a reason to impose a
death sentence.9 3 However, the Court has also required that the sen-
tencer not be precluded from considering evidence in mitigation of
future dangerousness.94 Nevertheless, the underlying constitutional
basis for considering future dangerousness and parole ineligibility has
been inconsistent. Initially, the Court reasoned that the Eighth
Amendment's individualized sentencing requirement allowed a capi-
tal defendant to introduce mitigating evidence in defense of argu-
ments concerning future dangerousness.95 Later, the Court reasoned
that the Due Process Clause allowed a capital defendant to inform the
jury of parole ineligibility as a means of rebutting arguments of future
dangerousness. 96 Since its decision in Simmons, the Court has relied
90. Id at 364.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272 (1976) (examining a Texas capital sen-
tencing statute that required the jury to predict whether the defendant would commit
future criminal acts or be a threat to society).
93. See id. at 275 (noting that the "prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential
element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system").
94. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1981).
95. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (explaining that evidence
presented by the defendant that suggests he would not pose a future danger if sentenced
to imprisonment rather than death is potentially mitigating and cannot be excluded from
jury consideration under Eddings).
96. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994) (holding that due process
requires that the defendant be allowed to present information regarding parole ineligibil-
ity to the jury when the prosecution argues future dangerousness).
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exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment to address the issue of fu-
ture dangerousness and parole ineligibility in capital sentencing.
1. Future Dangerousness Under the Eighth Amendment's Individual-
ized Sentencing Standard.-In Jurek v. Texas,9 7 the defendant challenged
a Texas statute that required the jury to predict the future behavior of
the defendant in considering whether to impose the death penalty.98
The Texas law posed three questions to the jury: (1) whether the act
was committed intentionally with the expectation that death would
result, (2) whether the defendant's propensity for future violence
would pose a threat to society, and (3) whether the act was committed
as an unreasonable response to provocation.9 9 If the jury answered
each of these questions affirmatively, believing that the state proved
each beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defendant would receive
the death sentence.' The Court upheld the question predicting the
defendant's future behavior because it allowed the jury to consider all
relevant information.' The Court further explained that allowing
the jury to consider aggravating circumstances alone would violate the
individualized sentencing requirement of the Eighth Amendment. 10 2
To meet the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, a statutory sen-
tencing scheme must allow the jury to consider not only why the sen-
tence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed.10 3 A
consideration of whether a defendant poses a future danger to society
is relevant in many sentencing determinations and in this case assured
that the jury had all relevant information about the defendant before
making a sentencing determination.'
In California v. Ramos,1' 5 the Supreme Court considered whether
informing a jury that a sentence of life imprisonment may be com-
muted by the Governor of California was unconstitutional under the
97. 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality).
98. Id. at 274. The Court, as a preliminary matter, rejected the petitioner's argument
that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional because it constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 268.
99. Id. at 269 (citing TEX. CIUM. PROC., art. 37.071(b) (Supp. 1975-1976)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 276.
102. Id. at 271.
103. Id. The Court also noted that allowing the jury to consider both aggravating and
mitigating circumstances ensured that the jury would have adequate guidance in sentenc-
ing and ensured that death sentences are not "wantonly" or "freakishly" imposed. Md at
276 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972)).
104. Id. at 275-76.
105. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
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Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.1" 6 The Court held that the in-
struction did not preclude an individualized sentencing determina-
tion or hinder the ability of the jury to consider mitigating factors.1 0 7
The Court reasoned that the instruction simply allowed the jury to
consider whether the defendant would pose a future danger if re-
leased from prison.' 8 The Court explained that the California capital
sentencing scheme ensured an individualized consideration of the de-
fendant's characteristics." 9 Furthermore, the instruction simply gave
the jury accurate information upon which to base its sentencing
decision.1
10
2. The Court's Increased Reliance on the Due Process Clause to Evalu-
ate Capital Sentencing Procedures.-Skipper v. South Carolina"'. marked
the first time the Court recognized that similar results would be com-
pelled by both the individualized sentencing requirement under the
Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 2 In Skipper, the Court was presented with the issue of
whether the exclusion of evidence regarding the defendant's good be-
havior in prison violated the individualized sentencing standard set
forth in Lockett and Eddings." The Court held that such evidence
must be considered potentially mitigating and, therefore, could not
be withheld from consideration." 4 The exclusion of mitigating evi-
dence compromised the jury's ability to consider the character of the
defendant, and thus failed to create an individualized sentencing de-
termination.' 1 5 The Court noted that if the prosecution argued that
the defendant would be a future danger, not only would the Eighth
Amendment under Lockett and Eddings require the consideration of
such mitigating evidence, but due process would also require that the
defendant have an opportunity to deny or explain the evidence
106. Id. at 994. The defendant argued that permitting a capital sentencing jury to con-
sider commutation was unconstitutional and would mislead the jury. Id. at 998.
107. Id. at 1013.
108. Id. at 1005. In reaching this conclusion, the Court dismissed the argument that an
instruction regarding possible commutation of the sentence would mislead the jury toward
predicting what a future governor might do. Id.
109. Id at 1005-06.
110. Id. at 1009. The Court explained that it would be inaccurate to describe a life
sentence as being without the possibility of parole when a governor, in fact, would have the
power to commute a sentence of life imprisonment to a sentence with the possibility of
parole. Id.
111. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
112. Id. at 5 n.1 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality)).
113. Id. at 3-4.
114. Id. at 5.
115. Id, at 8.
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presented against him. 1 6 The Court explained that when the state
seeks the death penalty based on a prediction of future dangerous-
ness, the individualized sentencing determination rule of Lockett re-
quires that the defendant be allowed to introduce evidence on the
issue of future dangerousness. The Court also noted that due process
would compel the same result because due process requires that a
capital defendant be afforded the opportunity to deny or explain the
evidence used by the prosecution in seeking the death penalty.117
In Simmons v. South Carolina,"1 8 the Court reached its holding by
exclusively relying on the Fourteenth Amendment, thus abandoning
the Eighth Amendment's individualized sentencing analysis used by
the Court in Skipper."' In Simmons, the trial judge prohibited the de-
fendant from informing the jury of his parole ineligibility as a mitigat-
ing factor, despite the prosecution's argument that the defendant
would pose a future danger to society.120 The defendant cited a pub-
lic opinion survey at trial explaining that the general public misunder-
stood the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment and argued that
a jury would choose a death sentence because they would mistakenly
believe that the defendant would be released from prison on pa-
role.' 2 ' After deliberating for some time, the jury inquired into
whether the defendant would be eligible for parole if sentenced to life
imprisonment.122 The trial judge informed the jury that parole was
not a proper issue for their consideration and that the terms "life im-
prisonment" and "death" were to be understood in their ordinary
meaning.'2 3 The jury subsequently returned with a verdict of
death.'24 The Court in Simmons recognized that the Skipper Court ex-
pressly noted that both the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause required the introduction of mitigating evidence when the
prosecution relied upon future dangerousness as a reason to impose a
116. Id. at 5 n.1 (citing Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362).
117. Id.
118. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality).
119. Id. at 162 n.4 (stating that the Court refused to consider whether the Eighth
Amendment would compel a similar result).
120. Id. at 159-60. Under South Carolina law, the only sentencing alternatives available
to the jury were life imprisonment or death. Id. at 178 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 159.
122. Id. at 160.
123. Id. Specifically, the trial judge's response to the jury stated: "You are instructed not
to consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching your verdict. Do not consider parole or
parole eligibility. That is not a proper issue for your consideration. The terms life impris-
onment and death sentence are to be understood in their plan [sic] and ordinary mean-
ing." Id.
124. Id.
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death sentence.1 25 Despite recognizing the dual basis for the decision
in Skipper, the Court chose not to address the Eighth Amendment ra-
tionale.1 26 Instead, the Court found only that the defendant's due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. 127
Accordingly, the Court held that if the prosecution argues the defen-
dant's future dangerousness as reason to impose the death penalty,
due process requires informing the jury of the defendant's parole
ineligibility. 12
8
Justice Souter, in a concurring opinion, recognized that the
Eighth Amendment would have compelled the same decision. z12 Jus-
tice Souter argued that the Eighth Amendment "entitles a defendant
to a jury capable of a reasoned moral judgment about whether death,
rather than some lesser sentence, ought to be imposed." ' ° Justice
Souter explained that a reasoned moral choice can only be made
when the jury is properly informed as to the meaning of the legal
terms describing possible sentencing alternatives. 131 Justice Souter
concluded that regardless of whether future dangerousness was ar-
gued by the prosecution, the jury in Simmons had misunderstood what
a sentence of life imprisonment meant. 3 2 Therefore, the decision to
impose the death sentence was unreliable and violated the Eighth
Amendment. 13
3
In contrast, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion reinforced
the due process rationale of the plurality opinion.' 4  Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that future dangerousness was a proper fac-
tor for jury consideration when the state seeks the death penalty.1 35
However, Justice O'Connor distinguished Skipper from Simmons argu-
ing that in Skipper the defendant sought to introduce evidence to dis-
prove the contention that he would be a future danger.13 6
Conversely, in Simmons, the defendant sought to use the operation of
the law to disprove the contention that he would be a future danger,
arguing that if sentenced to life imprisonment then he could not pose
125. Id. at 164; see also supra text accompanying notes 111-117 (explaining the grounds
for the Court's decision in Skipper).
126. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 162 n.4.
127. Id. at 162.
128. Id. at 168-69.
129. Id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 172-73.
133. Id. at 174.
134. Id. at 177 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
135. Id
136. Id. at 176.
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a future danger because he would never be released from prison.1 37
To accomplish this, Simmons needed the jury to be informed of his
parole ineligibility. 131 Justice O'Connor explained that as a general
matter, states are free to decide whether to inform a jury of parole
ineligibility. 13 9 However, when future dangerousness is argued by the
prosecution, informing the jury of parole ineligibility may be the only
way the defendant can rebut the prosecution's argument. 4 ° There-
fore, informing the jury of Simmons's parole ineligibility was neces-
sary to rebut the State's argument that he would pose a future danger
to society."4
In Shafer v. South Carolina,1" 2 the Supreme Court further solidi-
fied its reliance on the due process rationale of Skipperand Simmons.'43
In Shafer, the trial judge denied the defendant a jury instruction on
parole ineligibility after the prosecution had introduced evidence rais-
ing the defendant's propensity for future violence.14" In his instruc-
tion to the jury, the trial judge informed the jury that the term "life
imprisonment" means until the death of the defendant. 4 5 During de-
liberation, the jury inquired about the defendant's parole ineligibility,
but the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider this in their
sentencing determination. 46 Shortly thereafter, the jury returned
with a recommendation of death."' 7
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Simmons
did not apply to the statutory sentencing scheme because the jury had
a third alternative to death and life imprisonment. 48 The court de-
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 177.
141. Id.
142. 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
143. Id. at 51.
144. Id. at 41. Specifically, the prosecutor introduced evidence regarding the defen-
dant's prior criminal record, prior violent behavior, his misconduct in prison and previous
probation violations. Id. Additionally, in closing, the prose!cution stated, "they [referring
to the defendant and his two accomplices] might come back." Id. at 43. The trial judge
expressed concern as to whether this constituted an argument about future dangerous-
ness, but determined that it did not. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 44-45. The jury asked two specific questions: "1) Is there any remote chance
for someone convicted of murder to become elig[i]ble for parole? [and] 2) Under what
conditions would someone convicted for murder be elig[i]ble?" Id. at 44. In response, the
trial judge informed the jury that under South Carolina law "life imprisonment means
until the death of the offender" and that "[p1 arole eligibility is not for your consideration."
Id. at 45.
147. Id. at 45-46.
148. Id. at 49-50.
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termined that under the statute, if the jury found no aggravating fac-
tors, then the jury would not make a sentencing recommendation and
the trial judge would then choose between sentencing the defendant
to a minimum term of thirty years or life imprisonment. 149 Thus, the
defendant had three possible sentencing alternatives, death, life im-
prisonment, or a minimum prison term of thirty years.150 The United
States Supreme Court, reversing the South Carolina Supreme Court's
ruling, determined that a jury making a sentencing recommendation
only has the option to choose between death or life imprisonment.
151
The Court explained that under South Carolina law, it is only when
the jury finds an aggravating circumstance that their sentencing dis-
cretion is limited to death and life imprisonment. 52 The Simmons due
process concerns became apparent in this situation because only at
this point would informing the jury of parole ineligibility correct any
misunderstandings the jury may have about whether sentencing the
defendant to life imprisonment means imprisonment for the life of
the defendant.1 53 Therefore, the Court held that if future dangerous-
ness is at issue, then due process requires that the jury be informed
that life imprisonment means no parole.
1 4
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Kelly v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court held that the Sim-
mons holding was applicable to the South Carolina capital sentencing
scheme in place at the time of Kelly's trial.'55 The Court further held
that Kelly was entitled to an opportunity to inform the jury of his pa-
role ineligibility because the prosecution placed future dangerousness
at issue. 1 56 Writing for the majority,'5 7 Justice Souter began by dis-
missing the state supreme court's holding that the South Carolina sen-
tencing scheme creates two possible alternatives to a death sentence,
life imprisonment and a mandatory thirty-year sentence, thus render-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 50.
152. Id. Under South Carolina law, the third alternative would occur if the jury did not
find an aggravating circumstance, in which case the trial judge becomes the sentencer and
must sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment or a mandatory thirty-year sen-
tence. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 2001).
153. Shafer, 532 U.S. at 51.
154. Id.
155. Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 252 (2002).
156. Id. (stating that the state supreme court's determination that Kelly's future danger-
ousness was not at issue was "unsupportable on the record").
157. Justice Souter was joined by justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer in
the majority opinion. Id. at 247.
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ing Simmons inapposite.' 58 The Court referred to its reasoning in Sha-
fer v. South Carolina, decided less than one year earlier. 159 In reviewing
Shafer, the Court reiterated that under South Carolina law, a jury
makes a sentencing recommendation only upon the finding of an ag-
gravating circumstance. 6 ' If the jury finds an aggravating factor,
their sentencing recommendation is automatically limited to life im-
prisonment or death. 6 ' Therefore, the Court held the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court's determination that Simmons did not apply was in
error.
1 62
The Court then discussed the state supreme court's conclusion
that Kelly's future dangerousness was not at issue.1 63 The Court found
that evidence presented by the prosecution regarding Kelly's behavior
in prison raised the issue of future dangerousness.' 64 The Court ex-
plained that evidence of Kelly's propensity for violence in prison was a
generalized argument of future dangerousness.165 Accordingly, ajury
hearing such evidence could reasonably infer that Kelly posed a future
danger regardless of whether he was in prison or set free.
1 66
The Court highlighted the "fallacy" in the state court's attempt to
misconstrue the evidence presented at trial as simply evidence of
Kelly's inability to adapt to prison life and not evidence suggesting
future dangerousness.' 67 The Court explained that evidence of future
dangerousness, is any evidence which has a "tendency to prove dan-
gerousness in the future."16 Such evidence remains relevant regard-
less of whether it raises other inferences or is described in different
terms.'69 Similarly, while the prosecution's characterization of Kelly
as a "butcher" and the statement that "murderers will be murderers"
may have related to retribution, they also implied that Kelly would
158. Id. at 251-52.
159. Id. at 252.
160. Id.; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 2001) (providing in relevant part: "If
the jury does not unanimously find any statutory aggravating circumstances or circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall not make a sentencing recommendation").
161. Kelly, 534 U.S. at 252; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 2001) (stating that
"if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant must be sentenced to ei-
ther death or life imprisonment").
162. Kelly, 534 U.S. at 252.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 253.
166. Id at 253-54.
167. Id. at 254.
168. Id.
169. Id. More specifically, the Court dismissed the notion that a Simmons instruction is
only required when evidence with "no other possible inference" but future dangerousness
is presented. Id.
[VOL. 62:143
KELLY V. SOUTH CAROLINA
pose a future danger.170 Because future dangerousness was inferred,
Kelly was entitled to his requested jury instruction.'
South Carolina also argued that there was no need for the parole
ineligibility instruction because the jury did not inquire about the is-
sue. 1 72 The Court explained that simply because the jury did not
seem concerned with Kelly's future release, there is no indication the
jury was informed that a life sentence carried no possibility of pa-
role.173 In addition, the Court found the trial court's instruction, that
a sentence of death and a sentence of life imprisonment be under-
stood by their plain meaning, insufficient to convey a clear under-
standing of Kelly's parole status. 1 74 Thus, the Court held that Kelly
was entitled to a jury instruction regarding his parole ineligibility.' 75
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that the majority
opinion had no connection to the due process reasoning in Sim-
mons. 176 The Court's decision in Simmons rested on the notion that
when the state argues future dangerousness, the defendant is entitled
in rebuttal to inform the jury that he is ineligible for parole.' 77 Chief
Justice Rehnquist believed that unlike the prosecution in Simmons, the
prosecution at Kelly's trial did not place future dangerousness at issue
"in any meaningful sense of that term. '1 7'  Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued that evidence with a tendency to show future dangerousness,
or from which the jury could infer future dangerousness, would cer-
tainly be presented by the prosecution in most capital sentencing
hearings. 1 79 For example, evidence with a tendency to prove future
dangerousness could easily be inferred from evidence describing any
brutal crime to a jury.8 ° Consequently, there will rarely be a case
when a parole ineligibility instruction would not be required.'
170. Id. at 255.
171. Id. at 256.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 257.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 258-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued that the
Court purported to apply Simmons, but instead created a "truth in sentencing" doctrine,
which has no basis in due process. Id. Justice Kennedyjoined in ChiefJustice Rehnquist's
dissent. Id. at 258; see also supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text (discussing the Su-
preme Court's holding in Simmons).
177. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1994).
178. Kelly, 534 U.S. at 260 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 261.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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ChiefJustice Rehnquist also argued that the majority's holding in
Kelly departed from Simmons on the distinction between evidence of
danger in prison and evidence of danger to society at large.'1 2 Chief
Justice Rehnquist argued that pursuant to Simmons, the state could
argue future dangerousness in prison as a basis for the death pen-
alty." s3 Ajury instruction regarding parole ineligibility does not rebut
the argument that a defendant has a propensity for violence in
prison. 11 4 Therefore, ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued that Kelly's right
to due process was not violated by the trial court's failure to grant his
requested instruction. 85
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion, in which he
argued that there never was a basis for the proposition that due pro-
cess entitles a capital defendant to inform the jury of his parole ineli-
gibility when future dangerousness has been raised by the
prosecution. 186 Justice Thomas believed the Simmons decision should
have been limited in application to a narrow class of cases specifically
because it requires a factual inquiry as to whether future dangerous-
ness is at issue. 187 Justice Thomas argued that the Simmons decision
created an "imprecise standard," which led to the "entirely foresee-
able" result in Kelly of a broadening of the circumstances in which
Simmons applies.' 88 Justice Thomas reiterated Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's concern that the Court's decision will not only require a parole
ineligibility instruction in nearly all capital cases, but will also allow
the Court to further "micromanage" state sentencing procedures
"under the guise" of the Constitution.'89 Acknowledging that requir-
ing a Simmons instruction might be a better policy choice, Justice
Thomas nevertheless felt that sentencing procedures are a matter for
the state to decide. 90
IV. ANALYSIS
In Kelly, the Supreme Court relied on its decision in Simmons to
hold that evidence and arguments presented by the prosecution at
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 262-63.
186. Id. at 262 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 263 (noting that "it is not at all surprising that the Court today easily fits the
State's argument during Kelly's proceeding into the universe of arguments that trigger the
Simmons requirement").
189. Id. at 264-65.
190. Id at 265.
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trial placed Kelly's future dangerousness at issue.191 In addition, the
Court relied on its earlier decision in Shafer to reiterate that South
Carolina's capital sentencing scheme limited the jury's sentencing al-
ternatives to death and life imprisonment.192 Because future danger-
ousness was raised and the only sentencing alternatives available to
the jury were death and life imprisonment, the Court reversed the
South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling prohibiting Kelly from in-
forming the jury that he was ineligible for parole.19 The Court's ap-
plication of Simmons and Shafer to the facts of Kelly reinforced the
Court's reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to require that capital defendants be afforded an opportunity to
introduce evidence of parole ineligibility when the prosecution argues
future dangerousness as a reason to impose a sentence of death over a
sentence of life imprisonment.1 94 While the Court reached the cor-
rect result, its reliance on the Due Process Clause perpetuates an im-
precise standard for determining when a capital jury should be
informed of a defendant's parole status when making a sentencing
determination. 9 ' The Court should have resolved this question by
utilizing the individualized sentencing standard under the Eighth
Amendment to require a parole ineligibility instruction in all cases
where the jury's sentencing alternatives are limited to death or life
imprisonment.
The Court's implicit reliance on the Due Process Clause in Kelly is
problematic for three reasons. First, informing the jury of parole inel-
igibility, pursuant to the Simmons due process rationale, fails to ade-
quately deny or explain arguments of future dangerousness. Second,
by requiring ajury to be informed of a defendant's parole ineligibility
only in those cases where the prosecution argues future dangerous-
ness and the jury's sentencing alternatives are between life imprison-
ment and death, the due process rationale compromises the ability of
capital sentencing juries to make informed sentencing determina-
tions. Finally, by informing the jury of parole ineligibility when evi-
dence presented by the prosecution has a tendency to show future
191. Kelly, 534 U.S. at 252.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 258.
194. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 752 U.S. 154, 171 (1994) (plurality) (holding that
due process entitles a capital defendant to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility when
future dangerousness is at issue and the only sentencing alternatives are death and life in
prison).
195. See Kelly, 534 U.S. at 263 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Kelly decision
extended the standard created in Simmons for determining when future dangerousness is
at issue).
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dangerousness, the due process rationale fails to provide a precise
standard for determining when future dangerousness is at issue. The
Court in Kelly could have avoided the consequences of the due pro-
cess rationale by instead relying on individualized sentencing stan-
dards developed by the Court's prior Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.
A. The Simmons Due Process Rationale Fails to Address Why a Capital
Jury Should Be Informed of Parole Ineligibility
The Court's reliance on the due process rationale in Kelly is prob-
lematic because the rationale, as originally applied by the Supreme
Court in Gardner and Skipper, used the Due Process Clause to address
different concerns than those presented in Simmons and Kelly.196 The
due process rationale derives from cases invalidating state capital sen-
tencing procedures that did not allow defendants an opportunity to
respond to evidence used by the prosecution to impose the death pen-
alty.' 97 For instance, in Gardner, the trial judge rejected the jury's advi-
sory verdict of life imprisonment and sentenced the defendant to
death after reviewing a presentence investigation report, relevant por-
tions of which were not disclosed to the defendant.'98 The Court de-
termined that this procedure violated the Due Process Clause because
the defendant was not given an opportunity to deny or explain the
evidence in the report.'99 The Due Process Clause was invoked in
Gardner because the secrecy of the report prohibited the defendant
from being able to respond to evidence presented against him.20 °
196. Compare Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986) (citing Gardner, the
Court explained that the introduction of evidence of the defendant's good behavior in
prison was required by due process when the prosecution argues future dangerousness as a
reason to impose the death penalty), with Kelly, 534 U.S. at 248 (reiterating the Court's
holding in Simmons that the introduction of the defendant's parole ineligibility is required
by due process when the future dangerousness of the defendant is at issue and the jury's
sentencing alternatives are limited to death and life imprisonment).
197. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality) (holding a capital de-
fendant was denied due process of law when not given the opportunity to explain or deny
evidence presented against him during sentencing).
198. Id. at 352-53.
199. Id. at 362.
200. Id. at 356. The Court reasoned that there was no opportunity for the defendant to
challenge the "accuracy or materiality" of the information contained in the report. Id. at
356. The Court contrasted Gardner with its decision in Williams v. New York, noting that
unlike the defendant in Williams, Gardner was not given the opportunity to challenge the
evidence considered by the trial judge. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). The Court also noted that
had the report been disclosed and had the defendant been given an opportunity to ex-
plain the evidence contained within, the trial judge may have been compelled to accept
the jury's advisory verdict. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362.
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Therefore, in Gardner, due process provided the proper analytical ra-
tionale to address the concern that a defendant facing the death pen-
alty should be able to rebut evidence presented against him.
In the context of future dangerousness, the Court correctly real-
ized in Skipper that there was an equal propensity for a violation of a
capital defendant's due process rights when the state argues that the
defendant will pose a future danger and the defendant is prevented
from introducing evidence of his past good behavior in prison.201 In
Skipper, the Court explained that if the prosecution argued the defen-
dant posed a future danger, due process would require that the defen-
dant have the opportunity to rebut this contention through evidence
of good behavior in prison.20 2 The due process rationale in Skipper
was correct because the introduction of evidence of good behavior in
prison directly sought to disprove the prosecution's argument by sug-
gesting that the defendant no longer posed a threat to those in prison
or society at large.2 °3
However, allowing a capital defendant to inform the jury of his
parole status when the prosecution argues future dangerousness, as in
Simmons and Kelly, does not deny or explain evidence and arguments
of future dangerousness in a manner that is consistent with the due
process reasoning in Gardner and Skipper. Unlike the concerns raised
in Skipper and Gardner, informing the jury of parole ineligibility does
not directly confront the argument that the defendant will be a future
danger. This is evidenced by the fact that in both Simmons and Kelly
the jury could have simultaneously believed the state's evidence that
the defendants posed a future danger while at the same time ac-
cepting that they were both parole ineligible. 0 4 Thus, informing the
jury of parole ineligibility did not deny or explain evidence that the
defendants posed a future danger. Rather, the defendants merely of-
fered the jury a reason to impose any sentence other than death. Nev-
ertheless, the plurality in Simmons and majority in Kelly relied solely on
201. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1985).
202. Id.
203. See id. at 10-11 (PowellJ., concurring). Justice Powell argued that evidence of good
behavior in prison would have confronted the prosecutor's arguments regarding the fu-
ture dangerousness of the defendant. Id. Justice Powell explained that the majority had
correctly noted that excluding such evidence violated the defendant's due process rights.
Id,
204. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1994) (acknowledging that
the jury may consider a defendant who is parole eligible as a greater future threat than a
defendant that is parole ineligible). Id. at 168. However, the effect of informing ajury of
parole ineligibility, even assuming the truth of the Court's assertion, does not directly deny
that the defendant will pose a future danger, only that he may be less of a danger to the
general public because he will be incarcerated.
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the Due Process Clause to hold that the defendant's rights were vio-
lated, concluding that the parole ineligibility instruction would have
offered the defendant the opportunity to rebut the argument that he
posed a future danger to society.205
Evidence of the defendant's propensity for violence in prison cre-
ates an equally problematic concern under the due process rationale
because an instruction regarding parole ineligibility does not deny or
explain the argument that a defendant would pose a danger in
206prison. In Kelly, the prosecution made several references to the de-
fendant's behavior while incarcerated, presenting testimony that Kelly
made a shank and spoke of taking a corrections officer hostage.20 7
The Court reasoned that this evidence raised the implication of future
dangerousness. 2°" At that point, the Court held due process required
that the jury be informed of Kelly's parole ineligibility.20 9 However,
informing the jury that Kelly would never be released from prison
does not rebut the evidence or the argument that Kelly will be danger-
ous in prison.2 10 Indeed, it may suggest to the jury an alternative rea-
son to sentence the defendant to death. Therefore, the due process
reasoning fails to address whether it was proper to inform the jury of
Kelly's parole status.
The Eighth Amendment's individualized sentencing standard
would have provided a better constitutional basis for the Court's deci-
sion in Kelly. The individualized sentencing standard provides an in-
dependent justification for informing a sentencing jury of a capital
defendant's parole ineligibility. This standard would require that
such information be presented to the jury as a potentially mitigating
factor, because parole ineligibility is a circumstance upon which the
jury may choose to impose a sentence less than death. 211 The Su-
preme Court has developed the individualized sentencing standard
205. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171; Kelly, 534 U.S. at 257.
206. See Kelly, 534 U.S. at 261 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that if the state
were to argue that the defendant posed a danger to those in prison, it would be "no an-
swer" to inform the jury that the defendant is ineligible for parole).
207. Id. at 248.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 261 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Court acknowledged this possibility,
noting that the prosecution was free to argue that the defendant would be a future danger
in prison, but stated that the prosecution may not mislead the jury by refusing to inform
them of the defendant's parole ineligibility. Id. at 254 n.3.
211. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986) (explaining that favorable
inferences that ajury may draw from evidence "would be 'mitigating' in the sense that they
might serve 'as a basis for a sentence less than death'" (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 605 (1977))).
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from the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.212 In Woodson, the Court reasoned that a "fundamental re-
spect for humanity underl[ies] the Eighth Amendment," which
requires an individualized sentencing determination in capital sen-
tencing cases.213 In Lockett, the Court expanded this mandate, ex-
plaining that the risk of imposing a death sentence when a lesser
sentence may be compelled is simply too great to withhold evidence
of mitigating factors from the sentencer.214 In Eddings, the Court fur-
ther explained the notion of individualized sentencing as not only re-
quiring that a state capital sentencing procedure not preclude any
mitigating factor from the consideration of the sentencer, but also the
sentencer may not refuse to consider all relevant mitigating evi-
dence.215 Thus, the individualized sentencing determination requires
that the procedure by which states select defendants for capital pun-
ishment take into account the "character and record of the individual
offender" in each specific case.2 16 As a result, an individualized sen-
tencing determination provides a better basis for the decision in Kelly
by allowing a jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence a defen-
dant can proffer for imposing a sentence less than death, ensuring
that the punishment chosen by the jury is an appropriate punishment
in each case.2 1 7
Under the Eighth Amendment, a capital defendant would be
able to inform the jury of parole ineligibility as a potentially mitigating
factor. Utilizing the Eighth Amendment's individualized sentencing
standard, a sentencing jury must be informed of a capital defendant's
parole ineligibility because such information goes to the defendant's
character, record, and the circumstances of the offense. 21 ' Addition-
ally, a capital defendant's parole status is a potentially mitigating fac-
tor, which the sentencer is required to consider.2 19 In capital cases,
parole ineligibility would be considered potentially mitigating because
212. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 364 (1977) (White, J., concurring) (explaining
the grounds for the Court's decision in Woodson).
213. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
214. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05.
215. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982).
216. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 364 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305).
217. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
218. See id. (holding that the Eighth Amendment requires a sentencer to consider the
character, record, and circumstances of the particular offense as a "constitutionally indis-
pensable part of the process").
219. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (stating "[e]vidence that the
defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated) must be considered poten-
tially mitigating. Under Eddings, such knowledge may not be excluded from the sen-
tencer's consideration.").
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it is a circumstance upon which the jury could determine that a defen-
dant deserves a sentence less than death.2 2 ° Accordingly, an individu-
alized sentencing determination provides a better rationale for
explaining why a parole ineligibility instruction would be required
when a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue because
the availability of the instruction would not hinge on whether it rebut-
ted the prosecutor's arguments and evidence. A parole ineligibility
instruction would be given as a matter of course to ensure that the
jury had before it all the relevant information about the defendant
prior to making a sentencing determination.
B. The Due Process Rationale Fails to Ensure an Informed
Sentencing Determination
The Court's reliance on the Due Process Clause to inform a jury
of a defendant's parole ineligibility only when future dangerousness is
at issue also fails to ensure that the sentencing jury will be fully in-
formed in every capital sentencing proceeding. The Court has repeat-
edly expressed the concern that capital sentencing juries are poorly
informed about the meaning of sentencing alternatives. 22' The pur-
pose of requiring juries to be informed of the defendant's parole sta-
tus when future dangerousness is at issue is to prevent the state from
misleading the jury into thinking the defendant will be a future dan-
ger, while simultaneously preventing the jury from learning that the
defendant is not eligible for parole. 2 22 For instance, in Simmons, the
Court felt that the jury was misled by arguments that the defendant
would present a future danger because they were not informed that a
sentence of "life imprisonment" carried no possibility of parole. 223
The Court in Simmons regarded the parole status of the defendant as
"crucial" information for the jury to consider in order to make a
proper sentencing determination.2 2 4 Similarly, in Kelly, the Court
noted that the jury was not properly informed as to the meaning of
the only sentencing alternative to the death penalty, life
imprisonment.22 5
The due process rationale allowing capital defendants to inform
the jury of parole ineligibility only corrects the potential jury misun-
220. See id. at 4-5.
221. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994) (stating that "it can
hardly be questioned that mostjuries lack accurate information about the precise meaning
of 'life imprisonment' as defined by the States").
222. Id. at 171.
223. Id. at 162.
224. Id. at 164.
225. Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 257 (2002).
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derstanding when future dangerousness has been raised.226 Further-
more, informing a jury of a defendant's parole status only when the
prosecution raises future dangerousness ignores the fact that the de-
fendant would be parole ineligible regardless of the arguments made
by the prosecution.227 Certainly, the jury would not be equally, or
more, confused if their sentencing alternatives were properly defined
in each case regardless of whether future dangerousness is at issue.
Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in Simmons that the trial judge only
added to the jury's misperception of the sentencing alternatives by
refusing to give accurate information regarding parole ineligibility. 228
Thus, there is no apparent justification for not informing the jury of a
defendant's ineligibility for parole in those cases where the defendant
is in fact parole ineligible. 2
29
An individualized sentencing determination would create a bet-
ter informed jury, which is necessary to ensure reliable sentences.
The Eighth Amendment's individualized sentencing standard is predi-
cated upon the underlying principle that a jury must be able to make
a "reasoned moral judgment" concerning the decision whether to im-
pose a sentence of death or some lesser sentence.23 ° While this princi-
ple rests on the qualitative difference between a sentence of
imprisonment and a sentence of death,231 it also rests firmly on the
notion that a sentencer should have all available information in order
226. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 168-69 (explaining that informing the jury of parole ineligibil-
ity when their only sentencing alternative to death is life imprisonment is required by due
process because it rebuts the argument of future dangerousness); see also id. at 178
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that due process requires the court to inform the
jury of parole ineligibility when future dangerousness is at issue and when the jury's only
sentencing alternatives are death and life imprisonment) (emphasis added).
227. The converse is also true. The fact that a defendant is eligible for parole also exists
regardless of the arguments made at trial. The Constitution does not prohibit the prosecu-
tion from arguing true information regarding a defendant's ineligibility for parole. Sim-
mons, 512 U.S. at 168. However, a state may choose not to inform the jury that a capital
defendant is eligible for parole, commutation, or a pardon in order to provide more pro-
tection to capital defendants under the state's criminal justice system than would be re-
quired by the Constitution. Id. at 168.
228. Id. at 161-62.
229. In her concurring opinion in Simmons, Justice O'Connor explained that a state may
properly choose to not inform the jury of a defendant's parole ineligibility when the prose-
cution does not argue future dangerousness and the only sentencing alternatives available
to the jury are death and life imprisonment. Id. at 176-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
However, such a conclusion ignores the fact that future dangerousness will most always be
considered by the jury even when the prosecution does not make an argument concerning
future dangerousness. Lynn Thompson Reid, BlindJustice: ExdudingReleuant Mitigating Evi-
dence During Capital Sentencing, 3J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 343, 358-59 (1999).
230. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).
231. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (noting that the death
sentence is qualitatively different from any other capital sentencing alternative).
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to make an informed, reliable decision. 23 2 As a result, the need for
reliability in sentencing necessitates that the jury be instructed on the
meaning of legal terms and sentences whenever there is the reasona-
ble probability that the jury might misunderstand an instruction.233
A common manifestation of a jury's confusion surrounding the
precise meanings of sentences occurs when the jury asks the trial
judge for clarification about sentences during their deliberations. For
example, in Simmons, the jury inquired if a life sentence carried the
possibility of parole, to which the trial judge responded that "life im-
prisonment" and "death" were defined by their ordinary meaning. 234
The Court in Simmons explained that juries lack accurate information
regarding the meaning of a life imprisonment sentence and com-
monly mistake prison terms for being shorter than stated.235 Unlike
the due process rationale, the individualized sentencing standard
would simply require the judge to inform the jury of the defendant's
parole ineligibility thereby instructing the jury as to the meanings of
legal terms used to define sentencing alternatives.236 In utilizing an
individualized sentencing standard, a capital sentencing jury will not
be misled and, therefore, will be capable of providing a well-reasoned
sentencing determination.
C. The Due Process Rationale Creates an Imprecise Standard for
Determining When Future Dangerousness is at Issue
A final limitation of the due process rationale is that it creates an
imprecise standard for determining when future dangerousness is at
issue. The Court's decision in Simmons required a parole ineligibility
instruction when the prosecution makes generalized arguments of fu-
ture dangerousness and when the only sentencing alternatives are
death or life imprisonment.23 7 In applying Simmons to the facts in
Kelly, the Court broadened the circumstances of when future danger-
ousness is at issue to include the introduction of evidence with a "ten-
dency to prove dangerousness in the future. '2 8 In doing so, the
Court created a subjective standard which complicates the inquiry
necessary to determine whether future dangerousness is at issue. As a
result, in future cases the court must stringently review evidence and
232. Id. at 305.
233. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).
234. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 160.
235. Id. at 169.
236. Id. at 172 (SouterJ., concurring).
237. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171.
238. Kelly, 534 U.S. 246, 263 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the factual
inquiry as to future dangerousness required by Simmons is now a more expansive inquiry).
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arguments made by the prosecution to determine whether the future
dangerousness of the defendant was shown, argued, or placed at
issue.239
The likely result of the case-by-case inquiry required under the
Kelly standard is that a jury instruction on the defendant's parole sta-
tus will be required in almost all capital cases. 24" As Justice Rehnquist
points out in his dissent, a jury may well infer future dangerousness
from evidence of the brutality of a crime or evidence used to prove
elements of the crime.241 Therefore, under Kelly, future dangerous-
ness need not actually be argued by the prosecution; it must simply be
suggested by the evidence presented.242
In contrast, the individualized sentencing standard would provide
a bright-line rule, making the factual inquiry into whether future dan-
gerousness was raised irrelevant. 243 An instruction as to parole ineligi-
bility would be required in all cases where a jury's sentencing
alternatives were limited to death or life in prison. Requiring a jury
instruction on parole ineligibility under the Eighth Amendment
would also allow for judicial efficiency by relieving courts from the
burden of reviewing state sentencing procedures under the detailed
factual inquiry required by Kelly. As Justice Thomas's dissent noted in
Kelly, the due process rationale will further require the Court's inter-
vention because deciding whether future dangerousness was raised re-
quires a factual determination in every capital case. 2" Under the
individualized sentencing standard, juries would be instructed on pa-
role ineligibility in all capital cases regardless of the prosecution's ar-
guments, thus, avoiding any factual inquiry. Accordingly, the
individualized sentencing standard, pursuant to the Eighth Amend-
ment, provides a more precise standard than the due process ratio-
nale for determining when future dangerousness is at issue.
239. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that after the Court's decision
in Kelly, the due process violation will depend on the outcome of a factual inquiry designed
to determine "whether the State somehow showed the defendant's future dangerousness,
argued future dangerousness, or put ... future dangerousness in issue." Id. at 176-77.
240. Id. at 261 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
241. Id at 261-62.
242. Id. at 261 (stating "[t]he test is now whether evidence was introduced at trial that
raises an 'implication' of future dangerousness to society. It is difficult to envision a capital
sentencing hearing where the state presents no evidence from which a juror might make
such an inference").
243. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Eighth Amendment provides an independent rationale for informing
the jury of the defendant's parole ineligibility, which does not require an inquiry into the
issue of future dangerousness).
244. Kelly, 234 U.S. at 263 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Kelly, the Court's application of Simmons further diluted the
underlying due process reasoning for requiring a parole ineligibility
instruction in capital sentencing cases.24 5 Despite reaching the cor-
rect result, the Court failed to adequately connect this case to the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement. A similar result
could have been more appropriately reached by utilizing the individu-
alized sentencing standard the Court has recognized under the
Eighth Amendment. The Court should have resolved Kelly, by hold-
ing that the individualized sentencing standard requires a parole ineli-
gibility instruction in all cases where the jury's sentencing alternatives
are death or life in prison. This would have allowed the Court to
reach the same result, but in a manner that properly addresses the
issues raised, allows capital sentencing juries to make more informed
and reliable sentencing determinations, and eliminates confusion.
PAUL M. DILLBECK
245. Id. at 258-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority decision has
no "connection to the due process rationale of Simmons").
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